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APPARENT AUTHORITY: BASIS OF LIABILITY
Gulf Guaranty Life Ins. Co. v. Mrs. Erin Lewis Middleton,
individually and as Ex'x of the Estate of Victor L. Middleton, et al.,
361 So. 2d 1377 (Miss. 1978).
The doctrine of apparent authority is certainly not a new and
recently evolving scheme for finding liability. As early as 1885' the
courts emerged with this basic principle, but it has now grown into
one of the most inescapable liability traps. It is well-established in the
general laws of agency in Mississippi. Clow Corporation v. J. D.
Mullican, Inc.,2 McPherson v. McLendon,3 Steen v. Andrews,4 and the
present cases are but a few of the cases adhering to the doctrine of ap-
parent authority.
Pursuant to a master insurance policy effective July 24, 1970,
Citizens Bank, as agent of Gulf Guaranty Life Insurance Company,
issued Victor L. Middleton a credit insurance policy. This policy was
issued by one Broome, an employee of Citizens and the authorized
agent for Gulf Guaranty. October 23, 1978, Middleton sought a loan
and credit life insurance in the amount of ten thousand dollars
($10,000.00),' thus increasing the total credit insurance with Gulf
through Citizens to nineteen thousand and fifty dollars ($19,050.00).
A provision in the master policy, as well as in the certificate, limited
Gulf's liability to any borrower to ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00),
regardless of the number of certificates issued.' Middleton was'fifty-
six at the time of issuance. He died the day following the issuance of
certificate. Mrs. Middleton, executrix of her deceased husband's
estate, sought recovery of the face value of the certificate. Gulf
presented Mrs. Middleton with a check for nine thousand and fifty
dollars ($9,050.00) and tendered another check in the amount of nine
hundred fifty ($950.00). She refused the latter and brought suit for
the remaining ten thousand ($10,000.00) plus interest on the nine
thousand and fifty dollars ($9,050.00).8
'Rivari v. Queen's Ins. Co., 62 Miss. 720 (1885).
2356 So. 2d 579 (Miss. 1978).
'221 So. 2d 75 (Miss. 1969).
'223 Miss. 694, 78 So. 2d 881 (1955).
sGulf Guaranty Life Ins. Co. v. Mrs. Erin Lewis Middleton, individually and as ex'x.
of the Estate of Victor L. Middleton, et al., 361 So. 2d 1377 (Miss. 1978).
'For a comparable fact situation, see Flaherty v. Gulfco Life Ins. Co., 327 So. 2d
436 (La. App. 1976).
'The following was not the schedule in effect at the time of issuance of the master
policy. This schedule became effective April 14, 1971 and was the schedule in effect on
October 23, 1975.
Age of Insured Debtor Maximum Amount Maximum Term of Insurance
15-55 inclusive $20,000 60 months
56-60 inclusive 10,000 36 months
61-65 inclusive 5,000 36 months
66-69 inclusive 1,000 12 months
'The suit was instituted against Gulf Guaranty Life insurance Company, Citizens
Bank of Columbia, Mississippi, and Broome. Id. at 1380.
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The trial court found that the limitation in the policy was waived
since Gulf had written policies six times in the past in excess of the
limitation. The court held that the waiver of the limitations in the
past was a ratification of each excess transaction and Gulf was,
therefore, estopped to deny that the policy in question was in full force
and effect. The court further held that liability arose at his death. A
contrary decision, the trial court concluded, would be unconscionable
and inequitable.
The supreme court affirmed Gulf's liability' by holding that Gulf's
approval of the previous six instances of excess insurance, along with
its acceptance of the benefits, provided the basis for ratification of the
certificate in question.'" Thus, Gulf's argument that its lack of
knowledge prevented ratification was inapplicable under the present
circumstances.
The court cited McPherson v. McClendon" as controlling on the
law of agency and further stated its applicability to insurance agency
relationships in this state." McPherson holds that a principal is
estopped from denying the authority of his agent, especially where the
agent with the knowledge and consent of the principal holds himself
out to the world as having certain powers.' 3 Under this principle, the
court held, Broome was an agent of Gulf. Steen v. Andrews,' which
was also cited in McPherson, controlled on the issuance of apparent
authority. The court ruled that Broome created such authority.
Finally, the court rejected Gulf's contention that waiver and estop-
pel could not be used to enlarge the risks covered by a policy or create
a new and different contract. 5 This argument, the court noted, did
not overcome the fundamental fairness demanded by similar cir-
cumstances in Thurmond v. Carter.'6 In Thurmond, the court held
that a principal could not silently acquiesce in acts by his agent and
obtain the resulting benefits as long as the situation proved advan-
tageous, and repudiate the acts when an unfortunate occurrence
made it in his best interest to do so.1
7
'361 So. 2d at 1382. The supreme court reversed the trial court's decision on
Citizen's liability. They found both Citizens and Broome were held secondarily liable
to Gulf. Id. at 1384. See, e.g., Aven v. Singleton, 132 Miss. 256, 266-67, 96 So. 165,
167-68 (1923).
1Id.
"221 So. 2d 75.
"2361 So. 2d at 1382.
"221 So. 2d at 78.
"223 Miss. 694, 78 So. 2d 881 (1955).





GENERALITIES IN THE LAW
I. Agency Relationships
It is well-established that the general laws of agency apply to
agency relationships in the insurance industry. 8 In determining
agency problems, the courts have looked at two areas: first, the
nature of the agency - general, local or soliciting,"9 second, whether
the agency is one of express authority 20 or apparent authority.2 Each
case must stand on its own. A determination of whether a principal
will be' liable for the acts of his agent will necessarily depend "on the





The agent is often acting for the principal. To third persons, the
agent appears to actually be the principal or at least to have the same
powers. 23 However, in looking to the principal for liability, it is
necessary to assert on what basis the third person has standing against
the principal. Apparent authority may provide that basis. This
authority arises from conduct or representations by the principal that
allows third persons to reasonably believe that the agent has the
power to act.2 ' This belief in the agent's power will generally operate
to hold the principal liable to those who have changed their position
in reliance.2 5  Under apparent authority, however, detrimental
change in position is not essential.
2
1
Apparent authority is a privileged power possessed by the agent.
This power, which is based on the principal's manifestations of con-
"See, e.g., The Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Wolff, 95 U.S. 326 (1877);
McPherson v. McClendon, 221 So. 2d 75 (Miss. 1969); American Bankers' Ins. Co. v.
Lee, 161 Miss. 85, 134 So. 836 (1931); Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Bouldin, 100 Miss.
660, 56 So. 609 (1911).
"See, e.g., Saucier v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 189 Miss. 693, 198 So. 625 (1940);
Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Price, 169 Miss. 531, 152 So. 889 (1934); Yorkshire Ins. Co.,
Ltd. of London v. Gazis, 215 Ala. 564, 112 So. 154 (1927); Home Ins. Co. v. Soreby, 60
Miss. 302 (1882).
2 See, e.g., Bunge Corp. v. Biglane, 418 F. Supp. 1159 (D.C. Miss., 1976); Butler v.
Bunge Corp., 329 F. Supp. 47 (D.C. Miss., 1971).
2'Seee.g., NMS Industries, Inc. v. Premium Corp. of America, Inc., 487 F.2d 292
(C.A. Miss. 1973), McPherson v. McLendon, 221 So. 2d 75 (Miss. 1969); Steen v. An-
drews, 223 Miss. 694, 78 So. 2d 881 (1955); Wellford and Withers v. Arnold, 162 Miss.
786, 140 So. 220 (1932); Tarver v. J. W. Sanders Cotton Mill, 187 Miss. I 11, 192 So. 17
(1939).
22 16A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9121 at 391 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as APPLEMAN].
2'See, e.g., Canal Ins. Co. v. Bush, 247 Miss. 87, 154 So. 2d 111 (1963); Rivara v.
Queen's Ins. Co., 62 Miss. 720 (1885).
21W. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY § 8 at 13 (1964) [hereinafter cited as W. SEAVEY].
2 sSee, e.g., McPherson v. McLendon, 221 So. 2d 75, 78 (Miss. 1969).
2'See, e.g., Tarver v. J. W. Sanders Cotton Mill, 187 Miss. 111, 192 So. 17 (1939).
See generally, Cummings, Binding the Insurer-Apparent Authority and Estoppel in
Virginia, 27 WASH. AND LEE L. REV. 102 (1970).
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sent, allows the agent to bind his principal. 27 The consent may be
founded upon an inherent authority to bind or may be created by
ratification of the prior acts.
Whether it be by accepting premiums," accepting risks,2 or fill-
ing out and countersigning policies,3" the agent by his acts,
agreements, or representations can bind the insurer. However, as a
general rule, the insured has an obligation to ascertain the agent's
powers and limitations when he knows the agent is acting under
special or restricted authority.
3'
The test of the agent's powers is what the public believed he
possessed, rather than what his principal had actually conferred upon
him.3 2 If the agent, under the guise of apparent authority, seeks to
modify, waive or alter express provisions in the contract, it appears to
the public that he has this authority. The principal may therefore
find himself liable when his agent acts beyond power or authority ac-
tually conferred. 33 Where the insured has no knowledge, actual or
constructive, of restrictions to the contrary, the power of the agent to
alter or waive provisions is equal to that of the principal.3 " It is vital
to note that knowledge by the insured of the agent's limited ability to
act for his principal will discharge liability of the principal.3"
Sutherland v. Federal Insurance Company" was one of Missis-
sippi's first decisions on apparent authority. Earlier in Rivara v.
"W. SEAVEY, supra. § 8, at 14.
"See, e.g., Consolidated Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Landers, 235 So. 2d 818 (Miss.
1970); Progressive Fire Ins. Co. v. Brinson, 76 S.E.2d 807 (1953). See generally, CoucH
ON INSURANCE 2d § 26:228 (1960) [hereinafter cited as COUCH].
"See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Ours, 266 So. 2d 168 (D.C. Fla. 1972); St.
Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Loving, 162 Miss. 114, 140 So. 727 (1932). See
generally, Couch, supra at 26:196.
"See, e.g., Sunx Ins. Office Ltd. v. Gonce, 224 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1955); Canal Ins.
Co. v. Bush, 247 Miss. 87, 154 So. 2d 111, (1963). See generally, Couch, supra at
§ 16:181.
"Cavins v. Planters Bank & Trust Co., 187 F.2d 906, 908 (5th Cir. 1951); Bunge
Corp. v. Biglane, 418 F. Supp. 1159, 1165 (D.C. Miss. 1976); Consumers Credit Corp.
of Miss. v. Swilley, 243 Miss. 838, 849, 138 So. 2d 885, 889 (1962); Aetna Insurance
Co. v. Singleton, 174 Miss. 556, 566, 567, 164 So. 13, 16 (1935); See generally, COUCH,
supra § 26:70.
"Tarver V. J. W. Sanders Cotton Mill, Inc., 187 Miss. 111, 118, 192 So. 17, 19
(1939).
33Id.
"See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Loving, 163 Miss. 114, 119, 140 So.
727, 728 (1932); Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Ruble, 160 Miss. 206, 133 So. 223
(1931); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Clark, 154 Miss. 418, 122 So. 551 (1929); See general-
ly, COUCH, supra § 16:222.
"Richard v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 114 La. 794, 38 So. 563, 565
(1905).
"97 Miss. 345, 52 So. 689 (1910); In Sutherland, the agent bound the company in a
renewal agreement. However, the company had earlier revoked the agent's authority
without knowledge of revocation to the insured.
[Vol. 1:201
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Queens Insurance Company,37 the court had implied this principle by
holding that an insurance agent clothed with authority to make con-
tracts of insurance or to issue policies stood in the place of the com-
pany to the insured. In Germania Life Insurance Company v.
Bouldin,"8 the court reemphasized that insurance companies were
governed by the general laws of agency. 39 The court also held that an
agent with powers conferred by the principal or powers that third
persons had a right to assume the agent possessed would bind the in-
surer. The principal would be estopped from denying the authority of
an agent.
The courts have retained these general principles. In Mississippi it
is well-settled that an insurance agent acting with apparent authority
may through his actions, conduct, or misrepresentations waive or
modify provisions and consequently bind the insurer to an
applicant.'
II. Estoppel
If the insurance company permits the agent to act with the
semblance of full authority, it will be estopped to deny his authority. 2
If the agent knowingly changes the material facts or the risks in-
volved, the insurer is estopped from asserting the invalidity of the
policy.43 The insurer may also be estopped to deny a waiver of the
contract provision especially inserted for the insurer's benefit if the
agent acts in such a manner to cause third persons using ordinary and
prudent business habits to reasonably rely on him."
Likewise, a principal may be estopped to deny the existence of a
policy or an act of an agent where he accepts and retains the benefits
"62 Miss. 720 (1885).
:8100 Miss. 660, 56 So. 609 (1911).
'Id. See, e.g., The Globe Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Wolff, 95 U.S. 326 (1877);
McPherson v. McLendon, 221 So. 2d 75 (Miss 1969); American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Lee.
161 Miss. 85, 134 So. 836 (1931); Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Bouldin, 100 Miss. 660, 56
So. 609 (1911).
'"100 Miss. at 678, 56 So. at 613; see also Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v.
Delaney, 190 Miss. 404, 200 So. 440 (1941) where the general agent supplied with
forms to be countersigned, could waive any provisions contained within the policy.
" There are many recent cases adhering to this principle. See, e.g., Hohenberg Bros.
Co. v. Killebrew, 505 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1974); NMS Industries, Inc. v. Premium Corp.
of America, Inc., 487 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1973).
" See, e.g., Steen v. Andrews, 223 Miss. 694, 78 So. 2d 881 (1955). Union Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 222, 20 L. Ed. 617 (1871). See generally,
43 AM. JoR. 2d Insurance § 156 (1969).
"3See, e.g., Big Creek Drug Co. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 115 Miss. 333, 75 So. 768
(1917); Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. v. Wylie, 120 Miss. 681, 70 So. 835 (1916).
See generally, COUCH, supra § 26:132.
"See, e.g., Union Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Mobus, 217 So. 2d 23 (Miss. 1968);
Steen v. Andrews, 223 Miss. 694, 78 So. 2d 881 (1955).
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of a transaction.4 5 The basis of liability is that the agent at the time
had full knowledge of all the material facts of the retention of the
benefits. Thus, such knowledge is imputed to the principal.'6 Knowl-
edge imposes a liability upon the principal and prevents him from
profiting by his own wrong.4 7 Again, it is important to note that
knowledge by the principal is essential, and lack of full knowledge by
the agent cannot be imputed to the principal.48 "There can be no
estoppel by acceptance of benefits in ignorance of the facts by the
party allegedly estopped."-49
Estoppel generally is based upon five elements:
1. There must have been a false representation or a concealment
of a material fact.
2. The representation must have been made with knowledge, ac-
tual or virtual, of the fact.
3. The party to whom the representation was made must have
been ignorant of the truth of the matter.
4. The representation must have been made with the intention,
actual or virtual, that the party should act on it.
5. The other party must have been induced to act on it.5"
Estoppel is premised upon a prejudicial change of position by the
insured.5' The change must have resulted from the agent's apparent
authority to act, transact, contract, waive or modify. Usually it is an
overt action, but inaction or silence may also amount to a misrepre-
sentation or concealment.5 " In Deposit Guaranty National Bank v.
Prudential Insurance Company,53 the court stated, "In order for
estoppel by conduct to arise there must be intentional false representa-
tion or concealment of facts, and the party affected thereby must be
ignorant of the truth and must have been induced to act or fail to act
because of the conduct of the other.-
54
"See, e.g., Consolidated Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Landers, 235 So. 2d 818 (Ala.
1970). See generally, COUCH supra § 26:228.
"See, e.g., World Ins. Co. v. Bethea, 230 Miss. 765, 93 So. 2d 624 (1957); Hartford
Fire Ins. v. Williams, 165 Miss. 233, 145 So. 94 (1933); Home Fire Ins. v. Williams,. 165
Miss. 233, 145 So. 94 (1933).
"See generally, 28 Am. JUR. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 59 (1966).
"See, e.g., Vaughan v. Lewis, 236 Miss. 792, 112 So. 2d 247 (1959); Hall & Brown
Wood Working Machine Co. v. Haley Furniture & Mfg. Co., 174 Ala. 190, 56 So. 726
(1911).
"Simpson v. M-P Enterprises, Inc., 252 So. 2d 202, 207 (Miss. 1971).
"MYERS, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE LAw § 6:14, at 178 (1972).
"See generally, 16A APPLEMAN, supra. at § 9081 (1968); McPherson v. McLendon,
221 So. 2d 75 (Miss. 1969); Steen v. Andrews, 223 Miss. 694, 78 So. 2d 881 (1955).
"See, e.g., Strauss Bros v. Denton, 140 Miss. 745, 106 So. 257 (1925); McIntosh v.
Hill, 212 Ala. 136, 102 So. 101 (1924).
"Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 506, 511 (Miss.






A waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a
known and existing right. ss Knowledge of material facts is essential
in order for waiver to rest upon intention, although conduct by the
agent may also amount to a waiver. The courts, especially in in-
surance cases, have used the words waiver and estoppel inter-
changeably. Cases have generally interpreted the implied waiver by
the agent's conduct essentially as an estoppel."6 Waiver may be
shown by an express agreement or by implications from the acts and
conduct of the agent acting within his real or apparent authority. 7
However, a waiver will not be implied where neither the insurer nor
his agent had full knowledge of all pertinent and material facts.5 s
Courts recognize that general agents may waive provisions in con-
tracts, provided of course, that they are acting pursuant to either ac-
tual or apparent authority.5" The proof of the waiver must be clear
and convincing. 0 It also appears that there is a very distinct dif-
ference between waiving forfeiture clauses and waiving provisions
that operate to extend coverage when the subject matter is within the
terms of the policy.8' St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v.
Air Comfort Engineers, Inc. held that estoppel may apply to a
forfeiture of contracted benefits but cannot create a liability or
coverage not previously contracted.6 2 One case has even held that
under no conditions can the coverage be extended by waiver and
estoppel.03 This rationale is premised upon the basis that the insured
should not be able to take advantage of the insurer for something he
has not contracted or paid for, whereas in a forfeiture case, one is
waiving something he had a right to previously. 4
IV. Ratification
The principle of ratification differs from the principles of waiver
and estoppel. Ratification does not depend upon a change in position
543 AM. JUR. 2d, Insurance § 1053 (1969).
"Ins. Co. of St. Louis v. Yates, 200 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1967); Newriter v. Life &
Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn., 229 Ala. 359, 157 So. 73 (1934).
"Couch, supra. at § 26:232 (1960).
"Standard Life Inc. Co. v. Baldwin, 199 Miss. 271, 24 So. 2d 360, 361 (1946).
"Richard v. Springfield Tire and Marine Ins. Co., 114 La. 794, 38 So. 563 (1905);
Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 190 Miss. 404, 200 So. 440 (1941);
Canal Ins. Co. v. Bush, 247 Miss. 87, 154 So. 2d 111 (1963).
"Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, 285 So. 2d 908, 911 (Miss. 1973).
"Morris v. Am. Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 253 Miss. 297, 173, So. 2d 618 (1965); see
generally: Stonewall Life Ins. Co. v. Cooke, 165 Miss. 619, 144 So. 217 (1932); United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Yost, 183 Miss. 65, 183 So. 260 (1938).
"St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Air Conform Engineers, 253 So. 2d 525 (Miss.
1971).
"Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 98 Ga. App. 732, 106 S.E.2d 820 (1958).
"See 1 A.L.R.3d 1139 (1956).
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nor a detrimental reliance."5 The principal's liability may be based
upon expressed authority conferred on the agent,66 apparent author-
ity,67 acceptance and retention of benefits," prejudicial change in
position,66 silence or inaction inducing another to suffer prejudice,76
and acts and conduct amounting to waiver.7' None of these equate
with ratification, nor are they prerequisites. Ratification is a
unilateral act of confirmation by the principal after the agent has
acted outside the scope of his authority. 2 To constitute ratification it
is only necessary that the insurer manifest assent to the unauthorized
acts."
The conditions necessary to establish ratification are as follows:
1. A contract which is suceptible of ratification must be estab-
lished.
2. The contract must be one the principal himself could
authorize.
3. The person making the contract must have purported to act as
the agent of the insurer.
4. Ratification must rest upon knowledge of the facts by the prin-
cipal; the principal must be cognizant of what has been done or
must have intentionally acted.14 (There can be no implied
ratification of an act when at the time of claimed ratification,
the principal was ignorant of the facts.)
In Mississippi cases the knowledge requirement seems essential to
the principal's liability. Other states have held that the knowledge
necessary to ratify need not be actual but may be shown by customs
and course of dealing.
7 s
"W. SEAVEY, supra. § 32, at 58 (1964).
"Butler v. Bunge Corp., 329 F. Supp. 47 (D.C. Miss. 1971); Bunge Corp. v. Biglane,
418 F. Supp. 1159 (D.C. Miss. 1976).
'Clow Corp. v. J. D. Mullican, Inc., 356 So. 2d 579 (Miss. 1978); McPherson v.
McLendon, 221 So. 2d 75 (Miss. 1969); Steen v. Andrews, 223 Miss. 694, 78 So. 2d 881
(1955).
"Consol. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Landers, 235 So. 2d 818 (Ala. 1970); Progressive
Fire Ins. Co. v. Brinson, 88 Ga. App. 498, 76 S.E.2d 807 (1953); see also: COUCH, supra.
at § 26:228 (1960).
"McPherson v. McLendon, 221 So. 2d 75 (Miss. 1969). See generally: 16A
APPLEMAN, supra. at § 9081 (1968).
"McIntosh v. Hill, 212 Ala. 136, 102 So. 101 (1924); Strauss Bros. v. Denton, 140
Miss. 745, 106 So. 257 (1925).
"'NMS Industries, Inc. v. Premium Corp. of Am., Inc., 487 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1973);
Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. Killebrew, 505 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1974).
"W. SEAVEY, supra. § 32, at 58 (1964).
"Id. § 37 at 67.
'COUCH, supra. at § 26:33 (1960). Gulf Refining Co. v. Travis, 201 Miss. 336, 29
So. 2d 100; sugg. of error overr. 30 So. 2d 398 (1974); Ledoux v. Old Republic Life Ins.
Co., 253 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 1970); Flaherty v. Gulfco Life Ins. Co., 327 So. 2d 436
(La. App. 1976).
"Shaw v. Bailey, 36 Ala. 250, 55 So. 2d 132 (1951); Alabama Mills, Inc. v. Smith,




Gulf Guaranty is the first time that the Mississippi Supreme Court
has addressed a fact situation of this nature.76 The court found the
principles of apparent authority and estoppel in McPherson v.
McClendon" controlling and held "No authority other than this deci-
sion is really essential upon which to base the conclusion reached as to
Gulf."7 Thus, it is clear that this decision was rendered in accord-
ance with agency law.
. The trial court found that Gulf had waived the limitations in the
master policy and was estopped from denying the certificate was in
full force and effect. Because Gulf had failed to repudiate the past ex-
cess policies and had retained the benefits, the court also found that
Gulf had ratified the issuance of this certificate. The Mississippi
Supreme Court did not discuss the principles of waiver and estoppel
in reference to current law which states that coverage can not be ex-
tended nor created by waiver and estoppel. Rather, the court sought
to base its decision solely on the agency law in McPherson v.
McLendon."8 Furthermore, the court did not explain why waiver and
estoppel was not a viable argument. The case revolved around an ex-
press provision limiting the insurer's liability and yet the court failed
to examine or explain their lack of examination of this argument.8 "
Mississippi law clearly reveals that waiver and estoppel cannot extend
coverage.8" In essence, Middleton was extended coverage that was ex-
pressly limited in the policy.
2
It appears that the court has now for the first time affirmatively
established that past conduct can be interpreted as a present ratifica-
tion of a particular act even without full knowledge of all the material
facts at the alleged time of ratification. 3 Gulf alleged that knowledge
"Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Delancey, 190 Miss. 404, 200 So. 440
(1941). This case was similar to the instant case in that the agent was furnished with
blank policies to be filled in, countersigned and issued by him without having to request
or secure approval from the principal. The court held that the agent had all the powers
of a general agent and could waive any of the provisions.
"McPherson v. McLendon, 221 So. 2d 75 (Miss. 1969).
"361 So. 2d at 1382.
T0 d.
"Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 234 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1970); Frank Gard-
ner Hardware and Supply Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 245 Miss. 320, 148
So. 2d 190 (1963); Employers Fire Ins. Co. v. Speed, 242 Miss. 341, 133 So. 2d 627
(1961).
"Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 234 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1970); Frank Gard-
ner Hardware and Supply Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 245 Miss. 320, 148
So. 2d 190 (1963); Employers Fire Ins. Co. v. Speed, 242, Miss. 341, 133 So. 2d 627
(1961).
"2361 So. 2d at 1379.
"Research of all Mississippi case law reveals no cases that affirmatively state that
past conduct can be interpreted as a present ratification without full knowledge of all
material facts.
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was an essential ingredient for ratification. In response, the court's
opinion reads, "This, of course, is the law, but can offer no comfort to
Gulf.''84 The supreme court explained that this particular situation
was based upon the events in the past.
In Shaw v. Bailey8s the Alabama Court of Appeals was addressed
with this similar problem and found that past acts constituted a
ratification of the current act. Here the court held that authority
from the owner to sell and dispose of property with full knowledge of
past sale may be implied by his acquiescence and ratification:
For instance, if the plaintiff here, prior to the time of the sale by his son
to the defendants of the bale of cotton here in controversy, had knowl-
edge that his son had shortly before, during that cotton season, sold
other bales of his cotton to defendants, and received the pay therefrom,
and that, upon being fully informed thereof by the defendants, he
made no objection, but ratified without protest the act of his son in
making such sales, then he is estopped from saying that the son had no
authority to make the particular sale here, unless the plaintiff shows
that before this sale he notified defendants that the authority of his son
had been terminated."
8
In a more recent Louisiana case,87 the court established ratifica-
tion of the unauthorized acts because the insurer with actual
knowledge had issued excess certificates twice in the past and the in-
surer had made no effort to repudiate the acts of the agent nor return
the benefits. Many cases have been cited supporting this proposition.
Before the decision in the instant case, it appears that Mississippi
had not affirmatively decided that past conduct, custom, or ac-
quiescence, can at a later time act as a ratification of the present act
without full knowledge at the time of the alleged ratification. Appar-
ently, however, the Mississippi Supreme Court has implied "ratifica-
tion" through waiver and estoppel principles. The end result there-
fore is a matter of terminology and interpretation. The court may
simply have found that Gulf, the insurer, was estopped from denying
"ratification" because Middleton, the insured, had been misled in the
past. For this reason, the decision manages to lay an unclear prece-
dent.
The court's refusal to rule that waiver and estoppel could not be
used to extend coverage merits further scrutiny. The decision clearly
holds that the doctrine of apparent authority is controlling. This doc-
trine however is based upon the principles of waiver and estoppel. It
is clear that Mississippi,"8 as well as the Fifth Circuit and other cir-
"361 So. 2d at 1382.
"Shaw v. Bailey, 36 Ala. 250, 55 So. 2d 132 (1951).
"Id. at 134.
8 7Ledoux v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 233 So. 2d 731. (La. App. 1970).
"Grain Dealers Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 234 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1970); Frank
Gardner Hardware and Supply Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 245 Miss. 320,
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cuits 0 asserts that waiver and estoppel may not be used to create
primary liability or extend coverage expressly excluded in the policy
terms. For example, in Employers Fire Insurance Co. v. Speed,"' the
policy excluded liability resulting from damage of the building while
in the process of construction unless entirely enclosed and under a
roof. The building, without a complete roof, was destroyed by a
windstorm. The court held waiver and estoppel can only have a field
of operation when the subject matter is within the policy and it can-
not operate radically to change the terms, notwithstanding the fact
that the applicant had contacted the agent who was supposed to write
construction coverage. A Louisiana Court in 197012 held that waiver
and estoppel cannot be used to extend or enlarge coverage beyond the
terms of the policy. Twice before an excess policy limitation had been
issued, and although the court affirmed the insurer's liability, it did so
on the basis of ratification and not on the basis of waiver and estop-
pel. In Mississippi Hospital and Medical Services v. Lumpkin, 3 the
supreme court held that waiver and estoppel cannot be used to create
a primary liability or to increase the coverage of insurance contracts.
There are numerous cases clearly purporting that the majority rule is
that waiver and estoppel cannot be used to create or extend liability."'
The opinion implies that the waiver and estoppel argument pro-
posed by Gulf was not sufficient to overcome the law expressed in
McPherson v. McLendon.9" Furthermore, the court in citing Thur-
mond v. Carter,"9 specifically held that fundamental fairness dictated
a favorable outcome for Middleton. In Thurmond 7 the court found
that a contractor who frequently retained convicts for hire, could not
silently acquiesce and obtain benefits so long as they were advan-
tageous and repudiate them when an unfortunate occurrence made it
to his interest to do so. In the instant case, 8 notwithstanding the ex-
press policy limitation, the supreme court ruled Gulf also should not
be able to accept the premiums and deny the excess policy later.
148 So. 2d 190 (1963); Employers Fire Ins. Co. v. Speed, 242 Miss. 341, 133 So. 2d 627
(1961).
"Kaminer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1973); Hemming v.
Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 427 F.2d 340 (Sth Cir. 1970).
"State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Petsch, 261 F.2d 331 (10th Cir. 1958); Mont-
gomery v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 250 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1957).
9 Employers Fire Ins. Co. v. Speed, 242 Miss. 341, 133 So. 2d 627 (1961).
"2Ledoux v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 233 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 1970).
"Miss. Hosp. and Medical Servs. v. Lumpkin, 229 So. 2d 573 (Miss. 1969).
"Supra, notes 88-90.
"McPherson v. McLendon, 221 So. 2d 75 (Miss. 1969).
"Thurmond v. Carter, 59 Miss. 127 (1881).
"Id.
"Gulf Guaranty Life Ins. Co. v. Middleton, 361 So. 2d 1377 (Miss. 1978).
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Conclusion
Gulf Guaranty Life Insurance Co. v. Middleton is one of the first
Mississippi cases to state that past conduct and acts may serve to bind
a principal under the theory of ratification, although the principal
lacks present knowledge. Knowledge is essential for ratification;
however, apparent authority has no element of pre-requisite knowl-
edge. The agency laws in Mississippi are well-founded and there are
numerous cases that purport apparent authority and resulting liabili-
ty as is evident by the instant case. Nevertheless Gulf is apparently
the first instance where waiver and estoppel was used to extend
coverage not previously contracted.
The problems inherent in this opinion are not uncommon to most
cases. The facts here were unique and the developed law had yet to be
applied to them. This led to the court's willingness and actually its
"need" to seek law applicable to the particular circumstances. In do-
ing so the court intertwined law and "emotion."
The concept of fundamental fairness can be very overwhelming.
The "need" for a court to bend and shape the result to conform to
what fairness dictates is certainly not a new scheme. When such con-
formations occur, opinions are often written that lay an unclear
precedent. It appears that Gulf Guaranty v. Middleton is such an opi-
nion.
Sharion M. Harp
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